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The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment  †
By Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr*
In recent years, considerable policy attention
has focused on the expansion of employment
opportunities for people with criminal records.
These efforts are motivated by the premise—
supported by observational, survey, and experimental research—that applicants with records
are disfavored by employers (see Schmitt and
Warner 2010 for a review). Because the poor
and minorities disproportionately have criminal records, these employment challenges may
exacerbate existing socioeconomic and racial
inequalities. Furthermore, job access for people
with records can reduce criminal recidivism,
potentially improving public safety (see, for
example, Yelowitz and Bollinger 2015).
This paper adds to the empirical evidence
regarding criminal records as a barrier to employment. We conducted a large-scale field experiment focused on the first stage of the employment
process: employer callbacks in response to job
applications. This is the stage in which most job
applicants are filtered out. Moreover, the front
end of the employment application process has
been the focus of the most influential recent policy effort in this area: the Ban-the-Box (BTB)
movement, which seeks to prevent employers
from asking criminal-record-related questions
(nicknamed “the box”) on job applications and
at interviews. The premise behind BTB is that
front-end discrimination keeps many applicants
with records from having a chance to impress
employers with their qualifications.
Our experiment confirms this premise. The
results presented in this paper are connected to

a larger project investigating BTB’s effects on
racial discrimination in New Jersey and New
York City (Agan and Starr 2016). Here, we provide more detailed analysis of a subset of our
data: applications from the pre-BTB period to
employers that asked applicants about records
(before it became illegal). Such employers were
60 percent more likely to call back applicants
without records, even though the records we
assigned applicants were minor (a single lowlevel, nonviolent felony approximately two
years earlier). The criminal record effect is large
in every subsample we investigate, regardless of
the crime type (drug versus property) or other
characteristics of applicants, employers, or
neighborhoods. On the other hand, this effect is
confined to employers that have the box—and
even before BTB, the majority of employers in
our larger experiment did not.
The core result presented here confirms that
of past field experiments (Pager 2003; Pager,
Western, and Bonikowski 2009; Uggen et al.
2014), but in a much larger and more recent
sample, and a modality (online applications)
that today dominates hiring in many industries.
Moreover, we analyze the interaction of the
criminal record effect with a variety of other
variables not considered elsewhere—an analysis
that confirms that effect’s ubiquity.
I. Method

In our broader experiment, we sent nearly
15,000 online job applications to companies
in New Jersey and New York City, before and
after those jurisdictions implemented BTB laws
in 2015. Agan and Starr (2016) provide methodological details, which we summarize briefly
here. This paper focuses on the 2,655 pre-BTB
applications sent to employers whose applications, at the time, asked about criminal records.
This sample includes applications sent to 1,426
establishments belonging to 95 chains. We targeted entry-level jobs requiring no college education, mostly in restaurants and retail.
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Starr: University of Michigan, 625 S. State Street, South
Hall 3230, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (e-mail: sbstarr@umich.
edu). This experiment relied on a team of hardworking
RAs and generous funding from Princeton University and
the University of Michigan. Detailed acknowledgments are
found in Agan and Starr (2016).
†
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Our fictitious applicants were men in their
early 20s. Half were randomly assigned felony convictions, and of these, we randomized
whether the conviction was for a drug or a property crime. All convictions were of similar legal
severity, at the low end of felonies for the relevant jurisdiction—for example, small-scale larcenies or drug possession.
We also randomized other application characteristics; the potentially important distinctions
were race (black and white), type of secondary
diploma (regular high school versus GED),
and whether there was a one-year gap between
past employment stints (versus no gap). Other
applicant characteristics (e.g., home address,
past employers) were randomly selected among
options designed to be substantively interchangeable while still disguising the similarity
of applications.
The outcome variable assessed below is
whether the applicant received a positive
employer response (a “callback”) via phone or
e-mail within eight weeks. We assess whether
callback rates vary by felony conviction status, and whether this record effect varies by
other applicant, employer, or geographic
characteristics.
II. Results and Discussion

A. Effects of Felony Conviction Status on
Employer Callback Rates
In Table 1, we present the results of this study
as simple summary statistics: callback rates for
applicants with and without felony convictions,
plus ratios and differences between the two.
Because felony conviction status is randomized
and uncorrelated with other applicant or job
characteristics, regression-adjusted effect estimates are essentially identical to the raw differences, and we do not report them here. Table 1
also shows no significance tests, but additional
regressions find that the conviction effect is statistically significant in every specification and
subsample we analyzed ( p-values generally
below 0.01, with standard errors clustered on the
employer chain).1
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In row 1, we show the full sample results.
Callback rates were 8.5 percent and 13.6 percent for applicants with and without convictions, respectively. That is, applicants without
convictions received 60 percent more callbacks
(5.1 percentage points). We report both ratios
and differences because both may be of policy
interest. In the subsample results below, similar
differences do not always correspond to similar
ratios (or vice versa), because overall callback
rates vary among the subsamples.
In panel A, we continue to use the full sample, but we subdivide the reported callback rates
for applicants with criminal records based on
their crime type: property or drug crimes. (The
no-conviction callback rate in both rows is thus
the same as in row 1.) The callback rates are
virtually identical for the two conviction types;
employers treated both categories of crime
equally adversely. This finding is contrary to
our prior assumption. Although the crimes
were all of similar severity, we expected that
more stigma would attach to theft and similar
convictions; avoiding employee theft is often
cited as a motivation for background checks
(Society for Human Resource Management
2012).
In panel B, we subdivide the sample by race.
The conviction effect is slightly larger for white
applicants: 5.7 percentage points, versus 4.5
percentage points for black applicants. Although
further regression analyses find that this interaction is not statistically significant, its direction
is nonetheless interestingly contrary to Pager
(2003, p. 959), who reports “nontrivial” (albeit
also not statistically significant) evidence that
“the effect of a criminal record appears more
pronounced for blacks than for whites.” Note
that we also found almost no overall racial difference in callback rates, in contrast to most
prior auditing studies. However, in Agan and
Starr (2016), we find that among employers
without the criminal record box (including these
same employers after BTB), white applicants
have a large advantage.
In panel C, we show separate results for New
Jersey and New York City, respectively. In proportional terms, the criminal record effect is

1

Regression analyses referred to in this discussion generally include key applicant characteristics (race, diploma
type, and employment gap) as well as chain and locality
fixed effects, except where the subsamples being discussed

are defined in a way (such as by race) to make particular
variables inappropriate. These variables are discussed in
more detail in Agan and Starr (2016).
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Table 1—Callback Rates by Conviction Status
No conviction
(percent)

Conviction
(percent)

Ratio

Difference

8.5

1.60

5.1

Panel A. Crime type
Drug (n = 1,952)
Property (n = 2,022)

13.6
13.6

8.5
8.4

1.59
1.62

5.0
5.2

Panel B. Applicant race
White (n = 1,348)
Black (n = 1,307)

14.0
13.1

8.3
8.6

1.69
1.52

5.7
4.5

Panel C. Jurisdiction
New Jersey (n = 1,037)
New York City (n = 1,618)

16.4
11.8

11.3
6.6

1.45
1.80

5.1
5.2

Panel D. Local crime
Above median (n = 1,328)
Below median (n = 1,327)

13.1
14.0

8.4
8.5

1.55
1.65

4.6
5.5

Panel E. Percent white, census block group
16.1
Above median (n = 1,327)
11.2
Below median (n = 1,328)

9.3
7.6

1.74
1.47

6.9
3.6

Panel F. Industry
Restaurants (n = 994)
Retail (n = 1,496)

6.9
8.7

2.03
1.45

7.1
3.9

Full sample (n = 2,655)

13.6

14.1
12.7

Notes: All applications were to employers whose applications asked about criminal records.
Local crime refers to crime rates based on precinct-level data in New York City and town-level
data in New Jersey.

substantially larger in New York City; indeed,
even the difference is slightly larger there,
despite much lower overall callback rates. In
New York City, applicants without records
received 80 percent more callbacks than those
with records; in New Jersey this difference was
45 percent (still a large effect, to be sure).
The next two subsample comparisons
assess more localized geographic differences.
Panel D explores whether local crime rates
affect employers’ consideration of criminal
records. One might expect, for example, that in
higher-crime neighborhoods employers would
be more familiar with and less averse to applicants with records; on the other hand, fear of
crime might be higher in such neighborhoods.
We linked employer addresses to reported crime
data, which was available at the police precinct
level in New York City and at the town level
in New Jersey.2 We aggregated seven major
2
Crime data come from public reports by police departments for 2015. The data for New Jersey are from the

reported crime categories that were common to
both jurisdictions’ reporting schemes (murder,
felony assault, robbery, rape, burglary, grand larceny, motor vehicle larceny) and calculated total
per capita crime rates, which we used to divide
the sample into “high crime” (above median)
and “low crime” halves.
The panel D comparison shows little difference between the conviction effects in
high-crime and low-crime neighborhoods.
We also conducted subsample analyses using

2015 Crime in the United States UCR report of Offenses
Known to Law Enforcement by City (https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-8/
table-8-state-pieces/table_8_offenses_known_to_law_
enforcement_new_jersey_by_city_2015.xls). New York
City crime data are reported by precinct (http://www.nyc.
gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/
seven_major_felony_offenses_by_precinct_2000_2015.
pdf). Because the New York City data were presented as
totals and not per capita rates, we combined them with
estimates of precinct populations from Infoshare Online
(infoshare.org), which are based on GIS mapping of census
data onto precinct boundaries.
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other crime-rate subdivisions (violent crimes
and property crimes alone), plus full-sample
regressions interacting the conviction effect

with continuous versions of the crime-rate variables. None of these analyses indicated that
local crime rates affect employers’ treatment of
criminal records.
However, panel E suggests some possible
variation in the conviction effect by another
local characteristic—neighborhood racial
composition. We linked employer addresses to
demographic data for the census block group,
and divided the sample into neighborhoods
with above- and below-median white population shares. In differences, the conviction
effect was twice as large in the whiter neighborhoods. Whiter neighborhoods had higher
callback rates overall, but the conviction effect
was larger there even in proportional terms (a
74 percent higher callback rate for applicants
without records, versus 47 percent in less white
neighborhoods).
It is possible, for example, that fear of crime
and/or stigma associated with criminal records
could be greater among hiring managers or
customers in whiter neighborhoods. Still, these
differences are only suggestive. In regression
analyses, the interaction between white population share and the conviction effect is statistically insignificant or, at best, marginally
significant, depending on the specification.
Moreover, the interaction between black population share and the conviction effect is not
even consistent in sign across specifications.
Other racial groups are quite large in these
jurisdictions, so these analyses are far from
mirror images.
Finally, in panel F, we show results separately for restaurant and retail employers, our
two largest industry categories. These show
a somewhat larger felony conviction effect
among restaurants, in both differences and in
proportional terms. However, in full-sample
regressions with an industry interaction, this
difference is statistically insignificant.
In sum, while there are some suggestive
differences between subsamples, the adverse
effect of having a felony conviction (even a
fairly minor and nonviolent one) is quite large in
every subsample we examined. When employers have access to criminal record information
on job applications, they consistently appear to
use it.
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B. Prevalence of the Criminal Record Box
One factor that may mitigate the adverse
effects of criminal records is that many employers do not ask about them on job applications.
The box sample analyzed here represents
36 percent of the total set of applications we sent
in the pre-BTB period of our larger experiment,
and 32 percent of the chains. That is, most job
postings that met our criteria were at employers
that, even before BTB, chose not to ask about
criminal records. While a few employers simply
complied early before the effective dates of BTB
in New York and/or New Jersey, most had no
box at all on their national application platforms.
This observation was surprising, because earlier research has found otherwise. For example,
Uggen et al. (2014), reporting on an experiment
carried out in 2007 and 2008 that similarly targeted entry-level, low-skill positions, found that
80 percent of employers had the box. Although
samples cannot be directly compared across different studies and cities, we suspect at least part
of the difference reflects the recent success of
the BTB movement (see Rodriguez and Avery
2016 for an overview). That movement has lobbied employers directly, plus the need to comply
with an expanding list of state and local BTB
laws may have persuaded national chains that it
is easier to drop the box entirely.
Still, this potentially good news for applicants with records should not be overstated. An
employer with no box on its initial application
can find out about records later; even BTB only
delays these inquiries, rather than barring them.
Criminal record checks are ubiquitous (Society
for Human Resource Management 2012).
It is possible that applicants with records will
nonetheless be better off without the box; the
assumption underlying BTB is that getting one’s
foot in the door matters. But it is also possible
that criminal record effects similar to those we
observed here could surface at non-box employers as well at other stages of the employment
process. Testing this possibility would require
research that goes beyond callbacks to assess
hiring outcomes.
III. Conclusion

This study offers the largest-to-date field
experiment testing the effect of criminal records
on employment access. It confirms that even
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fairly minor felony records have large negative effects on employer callbacks across a
variety of subsamples defined by applicant and
job characteristics. The effect on labor market
access may ultimately be limited by employers’ voluntary or mandatory elimination of
the criminal record box on job applications.
Although the policy concerns associated with
Ban-the-Box are complicated (Agan and Starr
2016 and Doleac and Hansen 2016 explore
unintended racial consequences), our results
here support its basic premise: when employers
inquire about them, felony convictions reduce
access to job opportunities.
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